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LOVEWELL v. PHYSICIANS INSURANCE CO.: PERSONAL
LIABILITY FOR PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
KARIN MIKA 1

On June 25, 1997, the Supreme Court of Ohio decided the case of Lovewuell v.
Physicians Insurance Co. 2 In Lovewell, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a
physician who decided not to settle a malpractice claim brought against him
3
could be made personally liable for any prejudgment interest award made. This
prejudgment interest award was made subsequent to a trial on the underlying
malpractice action at which the physician was defended by the attorney for his
insurer.4 The Ohio Supreme Court determined that personal liability for
prejudgment interest could attach despite the physician's possessing an
insurance contract that granted him the right to refuse settlement of a medical
5
malpractice claim.
The decision in Lovezvell presents a variety of intriguing issues and
unanswered questions relating to insurance law. First, it may no longer be
assumed that the insurer acts in tandem with the insured when the insurer is
defending a suit brought against the covered individual. In fact, because of the
Lovezuell decision, insurers and their insureds may wind up with opposing
interests during the course of litigation, even when they are theoretically on
the same side. Secondly, the Lovewell decision seems to be contrary to one of
the basic tenets of insurance law-that an insurance contract must be construed
liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer.6 Because the
contract in Lovewell was construed strictly against the insured, there will be
opportunity for insurers of all types to deny coverage for situations previously
were to be anticipated to be covered under the contract. Third, the decision
gives insureds cause to wonder whether a clause allowing them the right to
refuse settlement may result in personal liability.
Insurers and insureds alike need to be aware of the Lovewell decision and its
possible impact on current contractual relationships and on the negotiation of
future insurance contracts. As important as what was stated in the opinion of
the Ohio Supreme Court was what was not stated. The issues that were not

IB.A., Baldwin-Wallace College (1986); J.D., Cleveland-Marshall College of Law
(1989). Assistant Director of Legal Writing, Research & Advocacy at Cleveland-Marshall
College of Law.
2679 N.E.2d 1119 (Ohio 1997).
31d.

at 1121.

4

1d. at 1120.

51d.
6

at 1121.

See, e.g., Miller v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.E.2d 801 (Ohio 1969).
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addressed leave some previously settled concepts of insurance law wide open
for interpretation in the future.
Facts:
In 1992, Plaintiff Frank Lovewell brought a medical malpractice action
against Dr. Pradist Satayathum. 7 Dr. Satayathum's insurer was the Physician's
Insurance Company of Ohio. 8 Dr. Satayathum's insurance contract with
Physician's Insurance gave him the right to refuse a settlement with any
individual bringing a medical malpractice action against him. 9 Dr. Satayathum
exercised this right and refused to settle the claim.10 The medical malpractice
action went to trial. Eventually Dr. Satayathum was found liable for medical
malpractice and the plaintiff was awarded damages in the amount of
$200,000.11 Thereafter, the plaintiff made a motion for prejudgment interest
under section 1343.03(C) of the Ohio Revised Code alleging Dr. Satayathum
had failed to make a good faith effort to settle the case. 12 The trial court granted
13
this motion.
Although Dr. Satayathum's insurance carrier paid the damage award
14
assessed at trial, the carrier refused to pay the prejudgment interest.
Physician's Insurance cited Dr. Satayathum's personal decision not to settle as
the reason he should be held personally liable and the insurance company
absolved from any liability under the policy.15 The plaintiff, Frank Lovewell,
commenced an action against both Dr. Satayathum and his insurance carrier
to compel payment of the award. 16 Dr. Satayathum cross-claimed against his
carrier. 17 The trial court found that the insurer, in fact, was obligated to pay the
award under the policy. 18 Summary Judgment was granted on behalf of both

7

Lovewell v. Physicians Ins. Co., No. 68542, 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4606, at *3
(Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 1995).
8
1d. at *1.
9679 N.E.2d at 1120.
10

d.
111995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4606, at *3.
12

1d.

13

1d.

14679 N.E.2d at 1120.
151d.
161d.
17

1d.
18Id.
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Frank Lovewell and Dr. Satayathum. 19 Physician's Insurance appealed this
20
decision to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Appellate Court Decision:
In affirming the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals focused on two
major points. The court first concluded that it was obligated to glean the intent
of the contract "from the plain language of the policy and not the unexpressed
intentions of the parties."2 1 In doing so, the court focused on the insurance
policy which provided coverage for "all sums, . . . which [the insured] ...
22
legally become[s] obligated to pay as damages because of a medical incident."
Secondly, the court noted a long line of cases which characterized prejudgment
interest as "compensatory" rather than "punitive."23 Since the insurer conceded
that it would be liable for compensatory damages under the contract, 24 the
court held that the plain language of the contract covered "compensatory"
prejudgment interest stemming from a medical incident. 25 The court also noted
that since the insurer had given Dr. Satayathum the contractual right to refuse
settlement, it could not refuse to pay the prejudgment interest award when the
right was exercised. 26 The court held, in essence, that since Dr. Satayathum's
right to refuse settlement was included in the express language of the contract,
27
it was the insurer who legally refused a good faith effort to settle.
The Majority Opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court:
Chief Justice Thomas Moyer, writing for the majority, disagreed with the
lower court's assessment that the "plain language" of the contract necessarily
covered liability for prejudgment interest. 28 In fact, Moyer reached the opposite
29
conclusion about the "plain language" of the contract.

19679 N.E.2d at 1120.
201995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4606, at *3.
21
22

Id.
at *7.

1d. (Emphasis added by the court.)

23

1d. at *8 (citing Galayda v. Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 298 (Ohio 1994);
Moskovitz v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 635 N.E.2d 331 (Ohio 1994); Digital & Analog Design
Corp. v. North Supply Co., 590 N.E.d 737 (Ohio 1992); Dailey v. Nationwide Demolition
Derby, Inc., 480 N.E.2d 110 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984); Lawrence R.R. Co. v. Cobb, 35 Ohio

St. 94 (1878)).
241d.

251995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4606, at "10.
26

1d. at *10-11.

27

1d. at "11.

28679 N.E.2d at 1122.
291d.
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In reaching his conclusion, Chief Justice Moyer first commented that since
the question raised was one of contract interpretation, it was one to be resolved
by the court. 30 He then addressed the purpose of section 1343.02(C) of the Ohio
Revised Code. Moyer stated that the statute was enacted to encourage
settlement, prevent frivolous delays, and compensate a plaintiff "for the
defendant's use of money which rightfully belonged to the plaintiff." 31 He
stated that the court had held in the past that the named defendant was
"ultimately responsible for payment of a judgment rendered against her and
for payment of any prejudgment interest thereon." 32 He conceded, however,
that the statute itself did not allocate the burden of payment between the
33
tortfeasor and insurer.
In referencing the insurance contract between Dr. Satayathum and his
carrier, the court found that a medical incident was defined as "any act or
omission in the furnishing of professional medical services." 34 The court
disagreed with the argument that "but for" the original malpractice claim there
could not have been a prejudgment interest award. Moyer noted that there
were many other malpractice actions that resulted in a doctor's liability but did
not result in an assessment of prejudgment interest. 35
Disagreeing with the lower court, Moyer stated that the contract clearly did
not cover prejudgment interest because prejudgment interest was not
specifically listed as being covered. 36 The Chief Justice pointed out that
postjudgment interest was expressly listed as covered within the contract and
thus concluded there was a clear intent to include one and to exclude the
other.37 While the Chief Justice agreed that prejudgment interest should be
characterized as "compensatory" rather than "punitive," he concluded that even
compensatory prejudgment interest would not fall under the definition of a
damage stemming from a medical incident. 38 Finally, Chief Justice Moyer

30

1d. at 1121 (citing Alexander v. Buckeye Pipe Line Co., 374 N.E.2d 146 (Ohio 1978)).

31

Id. (citing Musisca v. Massillon Community Hosp., 635 N.E.2d 358, 360 (Ohio
1994)).
32

1d. (citing Peyko v. Frederick, 495 N.E.2d 918, 921 (Ohio 1986)).

33679 N.E.2d at 1121.

34Id.
35
36

1d.
1d. at 1223.

37

1d. The court noted that there was a substantive difference between prejudgment
and postjudgment interest. Id. The court noted that while prejudgment interest was an
award given when a defendant lacked good faith in the settlement negotiations,
postjudgment interest did not suggest bad faith. Id. Rather, it was an inducement for a
defendant to pay an award promptly. Id. Moyer pointed out that an award of
prejudgment interest required a hearing while an award of postjudgment interest did
not. Id.
38679 N.E.2d at 1123.
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stated that it would be illogical for an insurer to be liable for failing to make a
good faith attempt at settlement when it was the insured who chose not to
39
settle.
Other Opinions:
Justice Cook concurred in the opinion of the majority but approached her
decision with a different analysis. 40 Cook stated that the first inquiry was to
41
determine who was liable to the original plaintiff for prejudgment interest.
The justice concluded that Dr. Satayathum was the only individual liable under
the statute and that the statutory allocation of the award to the insurer was not
42
at issue unless the insurance contract covered the award.
Justice Cook then examined the plain language of the contract and
determined that it could not be read to cover prejudgment interest. 43 Although
the justice agreed with the majority's assessment that prejudgment interest was
not a damage that stemmed from a medical incident, she believed the majority
put too much emphasis on the potential that such a damage could possibly be
impliedly covered. 44 In conclusion, Justice Cook stated that there was no real
issue of fault with respect to liability. The justice commented that, "[W]hether
the failure to settle in good faith was the fault of the doctor or the insurance
company is only important if the policy language turns on fault."45
The remaining justices were split in their decisions. Justices Pfeifer,
Lundberg, and Stratton concurred with the majority.46 Justice Douglas
dissented. 4 7 Justices Resnick and Sweeney dissented and would have affirmed
the court of appeals. 48
Analysis:
The Supreme Court of Ohio and the Eighth District Court of Appeals reached
opposite conclusions regarding personal liability for prejudgment interest,
but each did so reading "clear and unambiguous" language to mean different

39

d. at 1124.

40

1d.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43679 N.E.2d at 1124.
44

1d. at 1125.

45

1d.

46

47

d. at 1124.

1d.

48679 N.E.2d at 1124.
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things. 49 In doing so, the courts have left open the question as to what basic
tenets of insurance contract interpretation should be applied in the future in
these situations. Moreover, neither court fully addressed the nature of the
fiduciary and legal relationship between the insured and the insurer. Since the
Ohio Supreme Court did not deal with this issue, numerous questions about
what will now be the ethical obligations between an insured and an insurer
where legal representation is concerned are left open.
Although both the court of appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court focused
their attention on the basic principle that terms of a contract, where
unambiguous, should be enforced and given their plain meaning, 50 neither
deals with another basic tenet of contract construction: ambiguous provisions
in an insurance contract should be liberally construed in favor of the insured
and against the insurer.51 While it is certainly logical to posit that a tenet for
interpreting ambiguous provisions should not be invoked when the provisions
are unambiguous, it would appear that there is a fair amount of ambiguity if
two different courts find that, after examining "unambiguous" provisions, the
contract "clearly" says different things.
It is impossible to speculate whether the Ohio Supreme Court would have
reached the same conclusion were they to have found ambiguity in the contract.
On the one hand, liberal interpretation in favor of Dr. Satayathum might have
lead to a finding that the contract covered prejudgment interest (as the court
of appeals found). On the other hand, such a finding would have been
contradictory to the court's opinion that the blameworthy party should be the
individual liable for the prejudgment interest. 52 One thing is certain, by the
court's decision in Lovewell, a change was made in the traditional legal
understanding that role of the insurer in litigation as being the representative
53
and protector of the interests of the insured.
The relationship between an insurer and an insured has traditionally been
one of a virtual synonymous identity between the two entities.54 This is
primarily because of the unequal bargaining powers between the two 55 that
enables the insurer to control the insured's monetary fate. 56 Even in Peyko v.

49

1d. at 1122; 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4606, at *7.
50679 N.E.2d at 1122; 1995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4606, at *7.
51
The Ohio Supreme Court mentioned this rule of contract interpretation but
determined that no ambiguity existed that would require its application. 679 N.E.2d at

1122.
52

1d. at 1124.

53

See generally, Douglas R. Richmond, Insured'sBad Faithas Shield or Sword: Litigation
Relieffor Insurers?, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 41 (1993).
54Id. at 42.
55 Id.
56

1d. at 44.
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Frederick,57 which the Ohio Supreme Court cited to support the premise that
the "responsible party" is ultimately responsible for paying prejudgment
interest, the court found that a responsible party could not hide behind the
mistaken premise that the identity of the insurer and the insured were
separable.3 8 This inseparability stems from many features that exist in the
relationship between the insured and the insurer. These are not unlike the
relationship between master and servant. Insurance contracts generally impose
the obligation of defense upon the insurer.59 By the same token, the insurer may
60
invoke any defenses the insured may have in the action.
In the case of Lovewell, Defendant Dr. Satayathum had a standard contract
obligating his insurer to defend him in a medical malpractice action; 61 however,
Dr. Satayathum's contract also contained a clause that allowed him to have
final say over any settlement. 62 There was no other clause explaining the
potential repercussions of refusing a settlement and what would transpire with
respect to the legal relationship he had with the insurer should he invoke this
contractual option. The court of appeals noted this lack of specificity with the
contract and stated that if the insurer wanted to "place the risk of withholding
consent to settlement on the insured, it could have done so in plain language
63
in the policy."
The Ohio Supreme Court did not address this issue in its opinion. Granted,
in doing so, the court may have suggested that there was ambiguity within the
contract; however, in failing to address this issue, the court left the door open
for future conflicts of interpretation. Since it is now likely that litigation will
arise as to whether an insured or an insurer will be responsible for paying a
prejudgment interest award, future courts will have to decide the significance
of "right to refuse settlement" clauses, and whether contracts containing such
clauses should also include an additional provision that clearly spells out the
personal monetary risk to the insured. Such a determination would comport
with general principles of insurance law that favor construction of insurance
contracts liberally for the insured and strictly against the insurer.64 Moreover,
this determination would serve a fairness aspect since it is likely that contracts

57495 N.E.2d 918 (Ohio 1986).
58
1d. at 920-21.
59

See, e.g., Sanderson v. Ohio Edison Co., 635 N.E.2d 19 (Ohio 1994); Motorists Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Trainor, 294 N.E.2d 874 (Ohio 1973).
60
See generally, Michael F. Flynn, Private Medical Insurance and the Collateral Source
Rule: A Good Bet?, 22 U. TOL. L. REV. 39 (1990).
611995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4606, at *3.
62679 N.E.2d at 1120.
631995 Ohio App. LEXIS 4606, at *11 (citing Karabin v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 462
N.E.2d 403 (Ohio 1984)).
64

See Miller v. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co., 253 N.E.2d 801 (Ohio 1969).
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containing a "right to refuse settlement" clause are likely acquired at a higher
premium than are contracts not granting such a right.
The Ohio Supreme Court's failure to discuss the repercussions of a missing
diclaimer of liability will likely result in future litigation dealing with conflicts
of interest between an insured and his insurer. In the case of a malpractice
action, an attorney for the insurer could be pitted against the insured when
issues of bad faith arise. In that situation, the insured would not only be left
without legal representation, but would be left on his own against the word of
his insurer. Any counsel that would be retained subsequent to a conflict about
liability for prejudgment interest would not have been part of the proceedings
that lead to the dispute. Furthermore, the insured might actually wind up in a
situation where he was not present at the proceedings where his personal fault
(bad faith) was determined.
Since the insurer and the insured will always be in a potentially adversarial
relationship whenever a "right of settlement" clause exists, there would be a
potential conflict of interest throughout every phase of a proceeding. An
insured who is not an attorney may not be aware that exercising his contractual
right may wind up making him personally liable for any part of the judgment.
There would additionally be an incentive for the insurer to minimize any part
it may have in a failure to settle, even if the position of the insurer is the same
as the insured respecting settlement. Frankly, some settlements might be
discouraged because the insurer would be aware throughout the proceedings
that if it is the insured who makes that choice under the contract, the insurer
may not be liable. It may be worth it for the insurance company to gamble on
litigation.
Furthermore, Lovevell somewhat confuses the premise that prejudgment
interest is to be regarded as compensatory rather than punitive. 65 While the
Ohio Supreme Court reiterated that prejudgment interest was to be regarded
as compensatory, but was not necessarily compensation stemming from a
medical incident,66 Dr. Satayathum was, in fact, penalized for exercising a
contractual right. While O.R.C. 1343.03(C) makes sense in the context that
prejudgment interest should be awarded if a legal representative would fail to
make a good faith effort to settle a case, imposing a legal standard of good faith
on a non-attorney would do no more than penalize a non-attorney for invoking
his or her right under the contract.
Lovewell adds a new dimension to insurance law. Individuals who have
contracts giving them final right over settlement should be concerned that
exercising such a right may result in personal liability. These same individuals
should be concerned about a potential conflict of interest that may occur when
being defended by the insurer. Lovewell seems to make necessary that an

65

See Musisca v. Massilon Community Hosp., 635 N.E.2d 358 (Ohio 1994).
66679 N.E.2d at 1123 (citing Galayda v. Lake Hosp. Sys., Inc., 644 N.E.2d 298 (Ohio
1994)).
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insured should retain separate counsel to protect his interests in case a potential
conflict of interest develops with the insurer.
With respect to the contracts themselves, insurers would serve themselves
well by making sure the inclusion of a clause giving right to refuse a settlement
includes with it a clause stating that personal liability may result from
exercising such right. In counseling insureds about settlement, it should be
incumbent upon the attorney for the insurer to make sure that the insured
knows that exercising the right may result in personal liability. When an
insured is not an attorney, his or her decision not to settle may be a decision
out of principle, but may also be legally ill-advised. The insured must be
apprised of the resulting risk. This could avoid any future suits against the
insurance company for its legal representation.
Conclusion:
The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Lovewell raises many issues regarding
the future of litigation involving parties who refuse to settle pursuant to a
contractual right. Although, on the surface, it would appear that the court
clarified what entity would ultimately be responsible for paying a prejudgment
interest award, its failure to address other issues left open the potential for
future litigation concerning the traditional relationship between the insurer
and the insured. While Lovewell does not necessarily mean the death knell for
"right to refuse settlement" clauses, both insurers and insureds need to be made
aware of the potential risks of having a contract that includes such a clause.
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